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Analysis of
Turkey's 2013 Kurdish Initiative
By YALÇIN DIKER
In January 2013,
the Turkish government's new initiative to seek a peaceful solution
to the ongoing conflict resulted in indirect negotiations with jailed
Leader Abdullah Ocalan. Consequently, the PKK announced a cease
fire and withdrew their rebels from inside Turkey borders. The purpose
of this essay is to analyze the Turkish Government's 2013 Kurdish
Initiative. The question is whether this initiative can help end
Turkey's Kurdish ethnic conflict?
Under the current
initiative both Turkey and PKK have an opportunity to reach a permanent
solution for mutual benefit. On the other hand, if peace talks fail,
this violent conflict may continue for another decade and could
end up in civil war. The Kurdish ethnic problem is complicated and
has international dimensions which would require comprehensive and
detailed research; therefore, this research paper will briefly touch
upon the Kurdish issues and then focus on the 2013 Turkish Government's
initiative.
Turkey's 2013
Kurdish initiative is Prime Minister Erdogan administration's second
attempt. The first Kurdish opening started in 2009 with a cease-fire
and symbolic returns of 34 PKK members from Northern Iraq to Turkey.
However, pro-Kurdish Party's (BDP) overstated welcoming demonstrations
resulted in a massive reaction by Turkish nationalists and the mass
media. Ending the first opening process was followed by the arrest
of Kurdish politicians.
The Turkish
government kept in touch with PKK and started secret negotiations
in Oslo. The government admitted to the negotiations after they
were leaked to the public. At the same time armed conflict between
the Turkish Army and PKK became more violent and the number of deaths
reached 700 in fourteen months, the highest number in thirteen years.
The jailed PKK Leader Ocalan sent a message to the Turkish government
announcing his willingness to help stop the violence. Months later
the Turkish Government created a new Kurdish initiative in January
2013.
Obviously the
aim is simply to stop the insurgency and attain peace. However,
paving the way to peace does not mean the same thing for each side.
The Turkish government wants the PKK to disarm before beginning
negotiations, while the PKK insists on democratic reforms and more
ethnic rights before any disarmament.
The Turkish
government took the first step and let the pro-Kurd politicians
visit jailed PKK leader Ocalan. The government then allowed Ocalan
to communicate "indirectly" with government and the public.
BDP parliaments' visit was the first during his14 year old incarceration.
Following this visit Ocalan sent letters to the PKK leaders asking
for a non-conflict period and the withdrawal of PKK militants from
Turkey. The PKK leadership in Iraq announced their loyalty to Ocalan
and declared a ceasefire. The non-conflict period and the withdraws
started in the spring.
During this
period Prime Ministers Erdogan's administration established a Wise-Men
Commission to gather public support to the ongoing initiative. In
this respect, a 63- Wise Men appointed by government amongst intellectuals,
scholars, performers, and NGO agents. The Wise-men independently
served as a messenger between the public and Turkish government.
The AKP proposed
that a Parliamentary Commission for the Kurdish initiative be established
in May 8, 2012. However, CHP and MHP announced that they would not
assign any representatives to this commission.
Next steps of
the peace process is still unknown by public. It is expected some
progress by government before the end of June 2013.
Turks and Kurds
have been living together in Turkey for about one thousand years
without a major conflict. The Kurd's problems are not with Turks
but rather with the Turkish government. Millions of Turks and Kurds
are married to each other. Turkey's new Kurdish initiative has had
broad support from Turkish, pro-Kurdish groups, media and international
actors. Generally, the media and international actors have faith
in the process.
Turkey's ethnic
Kurd conflict extends over two hundred years and this issue can
be solved only with pro-active political measurements. Turkey is
currently in a low-intensive war with the PKK; still, the Kurdish
issue cannot be irreducible as a terrorist activity.
The Kurds with
30 million in population are the largest stateless people in the
world, and they have had a long struggle with Iraq, Iran and Turkey.
It is therefore possible that the Kurdish self determination in
wanting to be recognized as an independent State may find broad
support and sympathy in the international arena. Kurds have had
autonomy in Iraq since 1970 and post-Saddam Iraqi constitution defines
Kurds as a federal entity.
Consequently,
Turkey may under the risk of separation and / or possible threat
of civil war; moreover, anti-Kurdish sentiment is growing in different
forms in Turkish society as seen in areas such as in social media,
soccer stadiums, magazines, Internet forums. Hence, Turkey has to
solve the ethnic issues with its Kurdish citizens and improve instruments
for living together in peace.
PKK has been
designated as a terrorist organization by European Union, United
States, Canada, Australia, United Kingdom and Turkey. Turkey's dilemma
is that Official and direct negotiations with an organization so
designated would be inappropriate for a democratic country but other
democratic Kurdish organizations are not able / eager to stop PKK.
The PKK also
has a dilemma. The PKK has demographic advantages, domestic and
diaspora support which may help the organization to survive for
another decade or even decades; it is still however not possible
for the PKK to defeat Turkey. In addition to this, according to
election results nearly half of the Kurds are supporting AKP. Religion
is one of the dominant factors in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia
and AKP using that for their political advantage.
These dilemmas
compel both parties to work with each other in order to reach a
resolution. This resolution can be either living together with different
forms of state or separating. But these alternative solutions are
not the subject of this essay.
First
impression of the Kurdish Opening of Turkish Government:
1. The ongoing
cease-fire is a temporary success for the Turkish government and
this presents the possibility of achieving permanent peace for country.
2. After 14
years in the jail, Ocalan still has the power to start or stop the
ethnic violence and willing to help reach a peaceful solution. In
pulling their militants from Turkey, PKK also shows a willingness
to settle this dispute with the Turkish government in the framework
of a dialogue.
3. The main
problem with this peace process is that either it doesn't have a
clear road map or the government intends to keep it a secret. According
to Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Besir Atalay this new initiative
will be as transparent as possible. It is understandable however
that due to the sensitivity involved that the procedures may not
be truly transparent; nevertheless, without a road map it is impossible
to understand and evaluate how this initiative will progress.
4. Most of the
Kurdish problems are as a result of the democratic consolidation
of Turkey, thus permanent peace could be attained once a mature
democracy is reached. The present constitution (prepared by 1980
Military Coup) and its' current practises (such as the strong central
government and weak local governments, the strong influence of executive
on legislative and judicial system, 10 percent electoral threshold)
hinder ethnic rights and democratization.
5. Turkish opposition
parties (except pro-Kurdish BDP) are not involved in the process;
however, the major opposition party's participation is essential
in these types of national issues in order to reach a permanent
solution.
6. Wise-men
committee is a good idea to smooth the process and to gather public
support. In practise selection of the members are arguable. Most
members were not expert any conflict or ethnic issues. They were
sent to public without a guide, reference or knowledge and they
faced the extreme reactions by nationalists or veterans. Due to
lack of publicity and preparation this exercise did not help to
create a public opinion for peace, but help to unification of the
Turkish nationalists. Wise-men committees completed their mission
and reported the results they gathered.
7. This peace
process is being managed by only a few of people. Considering the
sensitivity of the subject this method is appropriate. Typically,
communications between PKK and the government takes place through
media channels and otherwise through indirect means. This model
of communication may cause a significant amount of misinformation
signifying a need for a reliable third party to serve as a mediator.
8. Solving Turkey's
Kurd problem is not only essential for lasting peace in the country
but also for Turkey's membership in the European Union. (Nigar Karimova,
2001, p. 17)
9. A permanent
solution for the Kurdish problem would involve the creation of a
new constitution. In this respect the Kurdish conflict resolution
and Prime Minister Erdogan's political ambitions are closely linked.
It is well known that Prime Minister Erdogan is eager to be elected
as president giving him the ability to shape Turkish politics until
2023 which happens to be the hundredth anniversary of the Turkish
Republic. On the other hand, the political power of the Turkey's
president is limited. Erdogan wants to change the constitution and
switch the political system from parliamentary to a presidential
system. Using the Kurdish situation to his advantage he may change
the constitution to consolidate his political power and also solve
the Kurdish Issue.
10. Another
very important reason to end the ethnic conflict with PKK is the
financial cost. Turkey has spent nearly half a trillion dollars
over the past thirty years on counter terrorism.
Conclusion
and Recommendations:
Turkey's 2013
Kurdish initiative may help to resolve the current ethnic conflict.
To reach a permanent solution both the Turkish Government and the
Kurds should be well-meaning and patient. Both sides must also be
able to control their own nationalists. Ethnic nationalism is the
number one enemy in this issue.
The Turkish
government, bureaucrats, academics, elites and the Turkish people
should understand all aspects of the Kurdish issue; and, Parliament
and the opposition must be a part of this process.
The Wise-men
commission should be re-established with appropriately selected
Kurdish and Turkish people that would work on the conflict until
it is solved. Universities, NGOs and the mass media should become
involved by encouraging the parties to progress with the peace process
regardless of the effort, time and money.
A civilian and
modern democratic constitution and consolidated democracy is sine
qua non. This sine qua non includes free press, fair trial, rule
of law, absolute respect for Human Rights, and the improvement of
the democratic culture.
The disarmament
of the PKK and the granting of general amnesty would allow the PKK
to form a legal and legitimate political party, and an agreement
about what kind of post conflict justice mechanisms are to be used
(e.g. Truth commissions, trials, forgetting etc…).
As a result
Turks and Kurds have been facing a long and bloody period of ethnic
conflict with the PKK for the last three decades and Turkey's 2013
Kurdish opening is a historical opportunity not only for both side
but also for the region.
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June 2013
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